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Abstract
An evidence game is a strategic disclosure game in which an informed agent
who has some pieces of verifiable evidence decides which ones to disclose
to an uninformed principal who chooses a reward. The agent, regardless of
his information, prefers the reward to be as high as possible. We compare
the setup in which the principal chooses the reward after the evidence is
disclosed to the mechanism-design setup where he can commit in advance
to a reward policy, and show that under natural conditions related to the
evidence structure and the inherent prominence of truth, the two setups
yield the same outcome.
1 Introduction1
Ask someone if they deserve a pay raise. The invariable reply (with very
few and, therefore, notable exceptions) is, “Of course.” Ask defendants in
court whether they are guilty and deserve a harsh punishment, and the again
invariable reply is, “Of course not.”
So how can reliable information be obtained? How can those who de-
serve a reward, or a punishment, be distinguished from those who do not?
Moreover, how does one determine the right reward or punishment when ev-
eryone, regardless of information and type, prefers higher rewards and lower
punishments?
These are clearly fundamental questions, pertinent to many important
setups. The original focus in the literature was on equilibrium and equilib-
rium prices. This approach was initiated by Akerlof (1970), and followed by
the large body of work on voluntary disclosure, starting with Grossman and
Hart (1980), Grossman (1981), Milgrom (1981), and Dye (1985). A related
environment was considered by Green and Laffont (1986), but from a general
mechanism-design viewpoint, where one can commit in advance to a policy.
As is well known, commitment is a powerful device. The present pa-
per nevertheless identifies a natural and important class of setups—which
includes voluntary disclosure as well as various other models of interest—
that we call “evidence games,” in which the possibility to commit does not
matter, namely, the equilibrium and the optimal mechanism coincide. This
issue of whether commitment can help was initially addressed by Glazer and
Rubinstein (2004, 2006) (see also Sher 2011).
An evidence game is a standard communication game between an “agent”
who is informed and sends a message (that does not affect the payoffs) and
a “principal” who chooses the action (call it the “reward”). The two dis-
tinguishing features of evidence games are, first, that the agent’s private
information (the “type”) consists of certain pieces of verifiable evidence, and
the agent can reveal in his message all this evidence (the “whole truth”),
1The reader is encouraged to consult the online Appendix C for additional results,
extensions, notes, and discussions.
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or only some part of it (a “partial truth”).2 The second feature is that the
agent’s preference is the same regardless of his type—he always prefers the
reward to be as high as possible3—whereas the principal’s utility, which does
depend on the type, is single-peaked—he prefers the reward to be as close as
possible to the “right reward.”
An essential feature of evidence games is the possibility of revealing the
whole truth; the slight inherent advantage of the whole truth is used to
select equilibria, which we call truth-leaning equilibria. Specifically, these ob-
tain from limits of perturbed games with infinitesimal increases in the agent’s
utility when telling the whole truth, and in his probability of doing so. Truth-
leaning thus amounts to the following two conditions: (i) when the reward
for revealing a partial truth is the same as the reward for revealing the whole
truth, the agent prefers to reveal the whole truth; and (ii) there is a small
positive probability that the whole truth is revealed. These simple conditions
are most natural, and they (and variants thereof) have been repeatedly used
in the literature. The truth is after all a focal point, and there must be good
reasons for not telling it. As Mark Twain wrote, “When in doubt, tell the
truth,” and “If you tell the truth you don’t have to remember anything.”
Truth-leaning turns out to be consistent with the various refinement condi-
tions offered in the literature, and equivalent to many of them (such as the
equilibria used in the voluntary disclosure literature).
To see the effect of commitment we consider the two distinct ways in
which the interaction between the two players may be carried out. One way
is for the principal to decide on the reward only after receiving the agent’s
message; the other way is for the principal to commit to a reward policy,
which is made known before the agent sends his message (i.e., the principal
is the Stackelberg leader, which can only help him; this is the mechanism-
design setup). Our equivalence result can be stated as follows:
In evidence games the truth-leaning equilibria without commit-
ment yield the same (ex-post) payoffs as the optimal mechanisms
with commitment.
2Try to recall the number of job applicants who included rejection letters in their files.
3This differs from signaling and screening setups, where costs depend on type, and
cheap-talk setups, where utility depends on type.
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Simple examples that illustrate the result and the intuition behind it are
provided in Section 1.1.
A number of comments are in order. First, the result implies in particular
that among all Nash equilibria, the truth-leaning equilibria are optimal, i.e.,
most preferred by the principal.
Second, the “truth structure” of evidence games (which consists of the
partial truth relation and truth-leaning) guarantees that commitment can-
not yield any advantage. Whereas in the above-mentioned work of Glazer
and Rubinstein (2004, 2006) and Sher (2011), the commitment outcome is
obtained in some equilibrium of the game, but in general not in its other
equilibria—and there is no good reason for the former to be picked out over
the latter—in evidence games all truth-leaning equilibria yield the commit-
ment outcome.
And third, the fact that commitment is not needed in order to guarantee
optimality is a striking feature of evidence games; as we will show, the truth
structure is indispensable to this result.
We stated above that evidence games constitute a very naturally oc-
curring environment, which includes a wide range of applications and well-
studied setups of much interest. We discuss here only two such applications.
The first one deals with voluntary disclosure in financial markets. Public
firms enjoy a great deal of flexibility when disclosing information. While
disclosing false information is a criminal act, withholding information is al-
lowed in some cases, and is practically impossible to detect in other cases.
This has led to a growing literature in financial economics and accounting
(see for example Dye 1985 and Shin 2003, 2006) on voluntary disclosure and
its impact on asset pricing. The equilibria considered there turn out to be
(outcome-equivalent to) truth-leaning equilibria, and so our result implies
that the market’s equilibrium behavior is in fact optimal: it yields the opti-
mal separation between “good” and “bad” firms (i.e., even with mechanisms
and commitments—such as managers’ contracts—it is not worthwhile to sep-
arate more).
The second application concerns the judicial system. The system (the
“principal”) commits itself through constitutions, laws, legal doctrines,
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precedents—which include inter alia rules of evidence. All this affects what
evidence the parties (the “agents”) provide in court. An essential objective
of the judicial criminal system is to induce the optimal amount of separa-
tion between the guilty and the innocent and to get as close as possible to
the right judgement (“fit the punishment to the crime”). Our result says
that the power of these commitments does not, however, go beyond selecting
among all equilibria the truth-leaning equilibria—which are most natural in
this setup. A case in point is the legal doctrine known as “the right to remain
silent.” In the United States, this right is enshrined in the Fifth Amendment
to the Constitution, and is interpreted to include the provision that adverse
inferences cannot be drawn, by the judge or the jury, from the refusal of a
defendant to provide information. While the right to remain silent is now
recognized in many of the world’s legal systems, its above interpretation re-
garding adverse inference has been questioned and is not universal. The
present paper sheds some light on this debate. First, because equilibria in
general, and truth-leaning equilibria in particular, entail Bayesian inferences,
the equivalence result implies that the same inferences apply to the optimal
mechanisms; therefore, adverse inferences should be allowed, and surely not
committedly disallowed. Second, truth-leaning may well replace commit-
ment: rather than committing to rules such as the right to remain silent
and its offshoots, one may instead strengthen and reinforce the (perceived)
advantages of truth-telling. In England, for instance, an additional provi-
sion (in the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act of 1994) states that “it
may harm your defence if you do not mention when questioned something
which you later rely on in court,” which may be viewed, on the one hand,
as allowing adverse inference, and, on the other, as making the revelation of
only partial truth possibly disadvantageous—which is the same as giving an
advantage to revealing the whole truth (i.e., truth-leaning).
To summarize the main contribution of the present paper: for the class
of evidence games that we consider—which model very common and impor-
tant setups in information economics, setups that lie outside the standard
signaling and cheap-talk literature—we prove the equivalence between truth-
leaning equilibria without commitment and optimal mechanisms with com-
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mitment; moreover, we show that the conditions of evidence games—most
importantly, the truth structure—are indispensable conditions beyond which
this equivalence no longer holds. In a nutshell, the paper identifies the nat-
ural structure of evidence with its associated truth-leaning as the setup that
guarantees that commitment cannot yield any advantage.
1.1 Examples
We provide two simple examples that illustrate the equivalence result and
explain some of the intuition behind it.
Example 1 A professor negotiates his salary with the dean. The dean would
like to set the salary as close as possible to the professor’s “value,” while
the professor would naturally like his salary to be as high as possible. The
dean asks the professor if he can provide some evidence of his value (such
as whether a recent paper was accepted or rejected, outside offers, and so
on). Assume that with probability 50% the professor has no such evidence,
in which case his (expected) value is 60, and with probability 50% he does
have some evidence. In the latter case it is equally likely that the evidence
is positive or negative, which translates to a value of 90 and 30, respectively.
Thus there are three professor types: the “no-evidence” type t0, with prob-
ability 50% and value 60, the “positive-evidence” type t+, with probability
25% and value 90, and the “negative-evidence” type t−, with probability
25% and value 30. The professor can provide only evidence that he has, but
he may choose which evidence to provide (thus, for example, t− can either
reveal his evidence, or act as if he had no evidence, i.e., as if he were t0); see
the bottom arrows in Figure 1.
Consider first the game setup (without commitment): the professor de-
cides whether to reveal his evidence, if he has any, and then the dean chooses
the salary. It is easy to verify (see Appendix C.1) that there is a unique
sequential equilibrium, where t+ reveals his positive evidence and is given a
salary of 90 (equal to his value), whereas t− conceals his evidence and pre-
tends that he has no evidence. When no evidence is presented the dean’s







dean pays: 30 50 90
Figure 1: Example 1
i.e., the expected value of the two types that provide no evidence: t0 and t−.
See the top arrows in Figure 1.
Next, consider the mechanism setup (with commitment): the dean com-
mits to a salary policy (namely, three salaries, denoted by x+, x−, and x0,
for those who provide, respectively, positive evidence, negative evidence, and
no evidence), and then the professor decides what evidence to reveal. One
possibility is of course the above equilibrium: x+ = 90 and x− = x0 = 50.
Can the dean do better by committing? Can he provide incentives to the
negative-evidence type t− to reveal his information? In order to separate
and give different salaries to t− and t0 , the salary x− for those who provide
negative evidence must be higher than the salary x0 for those who provide no
evidence (i.e., x− > x0). Indeed, otherwise (i.e., when x− < x0) the negative-
evidence type t− will pretend he is t0 and has no evidence and we are back
to the no-separation case. Since the value 30 of t− is lower than the value
60 of t0, setting a higher salary for t− than for t0 cannot be optimal (indeed,
decreasing x− and/or increasing x0 is always better for the dean, as it sets
the salary of at least one type closer to its value). The conclusion is that an
optimal mechanism cannot separate t− from t0, and so the unique optimal
policy is identical to the equilibrium outcome, which is obtained without
commitment.4 ¤
4By contrast, t+ is separated from t0, because the value of t+ is higher. In general,
separation of types that have more evidence from types that have less evidence can occur
in an optimal mechanism only when the former have higher values than the latter (since
someone with more evidence can pretend to have less evidence, but not the other way
around). In short, separation requires that more evidence be associated with higher value.
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The following slight variant of Example 1 shows the use of truth-leaning;
the requirement of being a sequential equilibrium no longer suffices here.
Example 2 Replace the positive-evidence type of Example 1 by two types:
a (new) positive-evidence type t+ with value 102 and probability 20%, and
a “medium-evidence” type t± with value 42 and probability 5%. The type
t± has two pieces of evidence: one is the same positive evidence that t+
has, and the other is the same negative evidence that t− has (for example,
an acceptance decision on one paper, and a rejection decision on another).
Thus, t± may pretend to be any one of the four types t±, t+, t−, or t0. In the
sequential equilibrium that is similar to that of Example 1, types t+ and t±
both provide positive evidence and get the salary x+ = 90, and types t0 and
t− provide no evidence and get the salary x0 = 50 (the salaries are equal to
the corresponding expected values). It is not difficult to see that this is also
the optimal mechanism outcome.
Now, however, the so-called “uninformative equilibrium” (also known as
“babbling equilibrium”) where the professor, regardless of his type, never
provides any evidence, and the dean ignores any evidence that might be
provided and sets the salary to the average value of 60—which is worse for
the dean, as it yields no separation between the types—is also a sequen-
tial equilibrium. This equilibrium is supported by the dean’s belief that it
is much more probable that the out-of-equilibrium positive evidence is pro-
vided by t± rather than by t+; such a belief, while possible in a sequential
equilibrium, appears hard to justify. The uninformative equilibrium is not,
however, a truth-leaning equilibrium, as truth-leaning implies that the out-
of-equilibrium message t+ is used infinitesimally by type t+ (for which it is
the whole truth), and so the reward there must be set to 102, the value of
t+. ¤
Now, the simplicity of the above examples may be misleading, as in gen-
eral the equilibria can be quite complex and involve no easy unravelings
and thresholds (e.g., Examples 7 and 10 in Appendix B, where the agent’s
See Corollary 4 for a formal statement of this property, which is at the heart of our
argument.
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strategy must be mixed). Finally, for a simple illustration of how commit-
ment may yield outcomes that are strictly better than anything that can be
achieved without it, see Example 3 in Appendix B.1: it is a slight variant of
the above examples but with the professor’s utility depending on type (and
so it does not belong to the class of evidence games).
1.2 Related Literature
There is an extensive and insightful literature addressing the interaction be-
tween a principal who takes a decision but is uninformed and an agent who
is informed and communicates information, either explicitly (through mes-
sages) or implicitly (through actions). Separation between different types of
the agent may indeed be obtained when the types have different utilities or
costs (as in signaling, screening, and cheap-talk setups).
When different types have different possible actions—such as different
sets of messages—separation may be obtained even when the agent’s utility
and cost are the same regardless of his information. Grossman and Hart
(1980), Grossman (1981), and Milgrom (1981), who initiated the “voluntary
disclosure” literature, showed that unraveling obtains as a result of it being
commonly known that the agent is fully informed.
Disclosure in financial markets by public firms is a prime example of
voluntary disclosure. This has led to a growing literature in accounting
and finance. Dye (1985) and Jung and Kwon (1988) study disclosure of
accounting data. These are the first papers where it is no longer assumed
that the agent (in this case, the firm, or, more precisely, the firm’s manager) is
known to be fully informed. They consider the case where the information is
one-dimensional, and show that there is no longer unraveling in equilibrium.
Shin (2003, 2006), Guttman, Kremer, and Skrzypacz (2014), and Pae (2005)
consider an evidence structure in which information is multi-dimensional.
Since such models typically possess multiple equilibria, these papers focus
on what they view as the more natural equilibrium. The selection criteria
that they employ are model-specific. However, it may be verified that all
these selected equilibria are in fact truth-leaning equilibria, and so truth-
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leaning turns out to be a natural way to unify all these criteria.
In the mechanism-design framework where the principal commits to a
reward policy before the agent’s message is sent, Green and Laffont (1986)
were the first to consider the setup where types differ in the sets of possible
messages that they can send. They show that a necessary and sufficient con-
dition for the revelation principle to hold for any payoff functions is that the
message structure be transitive—which is satisfied by the voluntary disclo-
sure models, as well as by our more general evidence games. Ben-Porath and
Lipman (2012), Kartik and Tercieux (2012), and Koessler and Perez-Richet
(2014) characterize the social choice functions that can be implemented when
agents can also supply hard proofs about their types. Our social objective
can be viewed as maximizing the fit between types and rewards.
The issue of comparing equilibria and mechanisms originated in Glazer
and Rubinstein (2004, 2006). They analyze the optimal mechanism-design
problem for general type-dependent message structures, with the principal
taking a binary decision of “accepting” or “rejecting”; the agent, regardless
of his type, prefers acceptance to rejection. They show that the resulting
optimal mechanism can be supported as an equilibrium outcome; Sher (2011)
extended the result to the case in which the decision is no longer binary,
provided that the principal’s payoff is concave. By comparison, our paper
shows that, in the framework of an agent with type-independent utility, the
addition of the “truth structure” of evidence games—by which we mean
the partial truth relation together with the truth-leaning behavior—yields
the stronger result of the equivalence between the resulting equilibria and
optimal mechanisms.5 Finally, an example where commitment does not help
in a disclosure game is included in Bhattacharya and Mukherjee (2013).
2 The Model
There are two players, an agent “A” and a principal “P.” The agent’s infor-
mation is his type t, which belongs to a finite set T, and is chosen according
5Our companion paper Hart, Kremer, and Perry (2016) that deals with randomized
rewards discusses in detail the connections to the work of Glazer–Rubinstein and Sher.
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to a given probability distribution p = (pt)t∈T in ∆(T ), the set of probability
distributions on T, with pt > 0 for all t ∈ T . The agent knows the realized
type t in T, whereas the principal knows only the distribution p but not the
realized type.
The general structure of the interaction is that the agent sends a message,
which consists of a type s in T, and the principal chooses an action, which is
a real number x in R. The message is costless: it does not affect the payoffs
of the agent and the principal. An interpretation to keep in mind is that the
type corresponds to the (verifiable) evidence that the agent possesses, and
the message corresponds to the evidence that he reveals.
A fundamental assumption of the model (which distinguishes it from the
signaling and cheap-talk setups) is that all the types of the agent have the
same preference, which is strictly increasing in x (and does not, as already
stated, depend on the message sent). Without loss of generality (only the
ordinal preference matters here) we assume that the agent’s payoff is x itself,
and refer to x as the reward (to the agent).
As for the principal, his utility does depend on the type t, but, again, not
on the message s; thus, let ht(x) be the principal’s utility for type t ∈ T and
reward x ∈ R (and any message s ∈ T ). For every probability distribution
q = (qt)t∈T ∈ ∆(T ) on the set of types T—think of q as a “belief” on types—
the expected utility of the principal is given by hq(x) :=
∑
t∈T qt ht(x) for
each x ∈ R. The functions ht are assumed to be differentiable and to satisfy:
(SP) Single-Peakedness. For every q ∈ ∆(T ) the principal’s expected utility
hq(x) is a single-peaked function of the reward x.
A differentiable real function f : R → R is single-peaked if there exists a
point v ∈ R such that f ′(v) = 0; f ′(x) > 0 for x < v; and f ′(x) < 0 for
x > v. Thus f has a global maximum at v, is strictly increasing for x ≤ v,
and strictly decreasing for x ≥ v.
Condition (SP) requires all functions ht, as well as all their weighted
averages, to be single-peaked. Let v(t) and v(q) denote the single peaks of
ht and hq, respectively. Then v(t) is the reward that the principal views as
most fitting (“ideal”) for type t; or, the “value” to the principal of t (as in
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the examples in the Introduction). Similarly, v(q) is the ideal reward, or the
value, when the types are distributed according to q.
Some instances where the single-peakedness condition (SP) holds are:
• Basic example: Quadratic loss. Each ht is the quadratic distance from
the ideal point: ht(x) = −(x − v(t))2. In this case, common in much of the
literature, the peak of hq is easily seen to be the expectation with respect to
q of the peaks v(t); i.e., v(q) =
∑
t∈T qt v(t).
• Strict concavity. Each ht is a strictly concave function that attains its
(unique) maximum at a finite point (which implies that the same holds for
any weighted averages of such functions). For instance, ht is the negative of
some distance (not necessarily quadratic) from the ideal point v(t).
• Monotonic transformations. Apply a strictly increasing transformation
to the variable x, which preserves (SP) (but not concavity).
• Treat types differently, such as making different ht more or less sensitive
to the distance from the corresponding ideal point v(t); e.g., ht(x) = −ct|x−
v(t)|γt (with ct > 0 and γt > 1, so as to get strict concavity). Also, the
penalties for underestimating vs. overestimating the desired ideal point may
be different: take the function ht to be asymmetric around v(t).
We assume here that there are no further randomizations on the reward x.
In case lotteries on x are allowed, the above single-peakedness condition is no
longer sufficient and needs to be adapted; we analyze this in the companion
paper Hart, Kremer, and Perry (2016). When all the functions ht are concave,
the restriction to pure rewards is easily seen to be without loss of generality:
replace every lottery by its expectation.
We conclude with a useful property of single-peakedness.
In-betweenness property of the peaks. Let x0 := mint∈T v(t) and x1 :=
maxt∈T v(t); because all the functions ht(x) are strictly increasing for x ≤ x0
and strictly decreasing for x ≥ x1, the peaks v(q) for all q ∈ ∆(T ) satisfy
x0 ≤ v(q) ≤ x1. More generally, if q is a weighted average of q1, q2, ..., qn in
∆(T ), i.e., q =
∑n
i=1 λi qi with
∑n
i=1 λi = 1 and λi > 0 for all i, then
min
1≤i≤n




(indeed, all the functions hqi(x), and hence also hq(x) =
∑n
i=1 λi hqi(x),
are strictly increasing for x ≤ mini v(qi) and strictly decreasing for x ≥
maxi v(qi)). In particular, if T is partitioned into disjoint nonempty sub-
sets T1, T2, ..., Tn then min1≤i≤n v(Ti) ≤ v(T ) ≤ max1≤i≤n v(Ti), where v(T )
stands for v(p) and v(Ti) for v(p|Ti) (with p the prior and p|Ti the conditional
of p given Ti). The rewards may thus be restricted to the compact interval
X = [x0, x1] that contains all the peaks: any reward x outside X is strictly
dominated for the principal (by x0 when x < x0 and by x1 when x > x1).
2.1 Evidence and Truth
The agent’s message may be only partially truthful and he need not reveal
everything that he knows; however, he cannot transmit false evidence, as any
evidence disclosed is assumed to be verifiable. Thus, the agent must “tell the
truth and nothing but the truth,” but not necessarily “the whole truth.”
Let E be the set of (verifiable) pieces of evidence. A type t is identified
with a subset Et of E, namely, the set of pieces of evidence that the agent
of type t can provide (e.g., prove in court). The possible messages of t are
then either to provide all the evidence that he has (Et , “the whole truth”),
or to pretend to be another type s with less evidence (i.e., Es ⊆ Et) and
provide only the pieces of evidence in Es (a “partial truth”).
6 Thus the set
of possible messages of the agent when the type is t, which we denote by
L(t), is identified with the set of types that have less evidence (in the weak
sense) than t, i.e., L(t) := {s ∈ T : Es ⊆ Et}. This is immediately seen to
entail two conditions:
(L1) t ∈ L(t) for every type t ∈ T ;
(L2) if s ∈ L(t) and r ∈ L(s) then r ∈ L(t).
(L1) says that revealing the whole truth is always possible: t can always say
t. (L2) is a transitivity condition: if s has less evidence than t and r has
6The restriction that messages correspond to undetectable deviations (i.e., possible
types) is without loss of generality: Proposition 7 in Appendix C.3 shows that the equiv-
alence result continues to hold when additional messages are allowed.
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less evidence than s, then r has less evidence than t; that is, if t can say s
and s can say r then t can also say r. These conditions are standard; see for
instance Green and Laffont (1986), Bull and Watson (2007), and Appendix
C.3. From now on we abstract away from any specific setup and just assume
(L1) and (L2).
Remark. A type t thus has two characteristics: his value to the principal
(expressed by the function ht and its peak v(t)) and the evidence that he
can provide (expressed by L(t)). We emphasize that no relation is assumed
between value and evidence; in particular, having more evidence need not be
associated with having a higher (or lower) value.
2.2 Game and Equilibria
We start by considering the game Γ where the principal moves after the agent
(and cannot commit to a policy). First, the type t ∈ T is chosen according to
the probability measure p ∈ ∆(T ), and revealed to the agent but not to the
principal. The agent then sends to the principal one of the possible messages
s in L(t). Finally, after receiving the message s, the principal decides on a
reward x ∈ R.
A strategy σ of the agent associates with every type t ∈ T a probability
distribution σ(·|t) ∈ ∆(T ) with support included in L(t); i.e., σ(s|t), which
is the probability that type t sends the message s, satisfies σ(s|t) > 0 only
if s ∈ L(t). A strategy ρ of the principal assigns to every message s ∈ T a
reward ρ(s) ∈ R.
A pair of strategies (σ, ρ) constitutes a Nash equilibrium of the game Γ if
the agent uses only messages that maximize the reward, and the principal sets
the reward to each message optimally given the distribution of types that send
that message. That is, for every message s ∈ T let σ¯(s) := ∑t∈T pt σ(s|t) be
the probability that s is used; if σ¯(s) > 0 let q(s) ∈ ∆(T ) be the conditional
distribution of types that chose s, i.e., qt(s) := pt σ(s|t)/σ¯(s) for every t ∈ T
(this is the posterior probability of type t given the message s), and q(s) =
(qt(s))t∈T . Thus, the equilibrium conditions for the agent and the principal
are, respectively:
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(A) for every type t ∈ T and message s ∈ T : if σ(s|t) > 0 then ρ(s) =
maxs′∈L(t) ρ(s
′);
(P) for every message s ∈ T : if σ¯(s) > 0 then hq(s)(ρ(s)) = maxx∈R hq(s)(x)
(and so ρ(s) = v(q(s)) by the single-peakedness condition).
The outcome of a Nash equilibrium (σ, ρ) is the resulting vector of rewards




when the type is t the payoffs are pit for the agent and ht(pit) for the principal.
2.2.1 Truth-Leaning Equilibria
As discussed in the Introduction, evidence games may have many equilibria;
we are interested in those in which truth enjoys a certain prominence. This
is expressed in two ways. First, if it is optimal for the agent to reveal the
whole truth, then he prefers to do so (this holds for instance when the agent
has a “lexicographic” preference: he always prefers a higher reward, but if
the reward is the same whether he tells the whole truth or not, he prefers
to tell the whole truth). Second, there is an infinitesimal probability that
the whole truth is revealed (which happens, for example, when the agent is
not strategic and instead always reveals his information; or, when there are
“trembles,” such as a slip of the tongue, or of the pen, or a document that
is attached by mistake, or the surfacing of an unexpected piece of evidence).
To formalize this we use a standard limit-of-small-perturbations approach.
Specifically, given εt > 0 and εt|t > 0 for every t ∈ T (denote such a collection
of ε-s by ε), let Γε denote the following perturbation of the game Γ. First,
the agent’s payoff increases by εt when the type is t and the message s is
equal to the type t; i.e., his payoff is equal to the reward x when s 6= t, and
to x + εt when s = t. Second, the agent’s strategy σ is required to satisfy
σ(t|t) ≥ εt|t for every type t ∈ T. The agent thus gets an εt “bonus” in payoff
when he reveals the whole truth, and he must do so with probability at least
εt|t. A Nash equilibrium (σ, ρ) of the original game Γ is truth-leaning if it is
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a limit point of Nash equilibria of Γε as all the ε-s converge to 0; i.e., if there
are sequences εnt →n→∞ 0, εnt|t →n→∞ 0, and (σn, ρn) →n→∞ (σ, ρ) such that
(σn, ρn) is a Nash equilibrium of Γε
n
for every n.
In terms of the original game, truth-leaning turns out to be essentially
equivalent to imposing the following two conditions on a Nash equilibrium
(σ, ρ) of Γ:
(A0) for every type t ∈ T : if ρ(t) = maxs∈L(t) ρ(s) then σ(t|t) = 1;
(P0) for every message s ∈ T : if σ¯(s) = 0 then hs(ρ(s)) = maxx∈R hs(x)
(and so ρ(s) = v(s) by the single-peakedness condition).
Condition (A0) says that when the message t is optimal for type t, it is
chosen by t for sure (i.e., if the whole truth is optimal then it is strictly
preferred to any other optimal message). Condition (P0) says that, for every
message s ∈ T that is not used in equilibrium (i.e., σ¯(s) = 0), the principal’s
belief if he were to receive message s would be that it came from type s itself
(since there is an infinitesimal probability that type s revealed the whole
truth); thus the posterior belief q(s) at s puts probability one on s, and so
the principal’s optimal response is the peak v(s) of hq(s) ≡ hs. For a rough
intuition, (A0) obtains from the positive bonus in payoff, and (P0) from the
positive probability of revealing the type (if s is not used then it is not a
best reply for s by (A0), and so for no other type by transitivity (L2), which
implies that in Γε only s itself uses s with positive probability). We state
this formally in Proposition 1, which allows us to conveniently use only (A0)
and (P0) in the remainder of the paper.
Proposition 1 (i) Truth-leaning equilibria exist. (ii) For every truth-leaning
equilibrium (σ, ρ) there is an equilibrium (σ′, ρ) that satisfies (A0) and (P0)
and has the same outcome pi as (σ, ρ).
The proof is relegated to Appendix A. Truth-leaning may thus be viewed
as an equilibrium selection criterion (a “refinement”); alternatively, as part
of the setup (the actual game being Γε for small ε). In Appendix C.4 we
will see that truth-leaning satisfies the requirements of most, if not all, the
relevant equilibrium refinements that have been proposed in the literature.
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2.3 Mechanisms and Optimal Mechanisms
We come now to the second setup, where the principal moves first and com-
mits to a reward scheme, i.e., to a function ρ : T → R that assigns to every
message s ∈ T a reward ρ(s). The reward scheme ρ is made known to the
agent, who then sends his message s, and the resulting reward is ρ(s) (the
principal’s commitment to the reward scheme ρ means that he cannot change
the reward after receiving the message s).
This is a standard mechanism-design framework. The reward scheme ρ
is the mechanism. Given ρ, the agent chooses his message so as to maximize
his reward; thus, the reward when the type is t equals pit := maxs∈L(t) ρ(s).







The assumptions that we have made on the truth structure, i.e., (L1)
and (L2), are easily seen to imply that the “Revelation Principle” applies:
any mechanism can be implemented by a “direct” mechanism in which it is
optimal for each type to be “truthful” and reveal his type; see Green and
Laffont (1986), or Appendix C.5. The incentive compatibility constraints are
(IC) pit ≥ pis for every t, s ∈ T with s ∈ L(t)
(indeed, s ∈ L(t) implies L(t) ⊇ L(s) by the transitivity condition (L2), and
so pit = maxr∈L(t) ρ(r) ≥ maxr∈L(s) ρ(r) = pis). Thus an optimal mechanism
outcome is a vector pi = (pit)t∈T ∈ RT that maximizes H(pi) subject to (IC).
3 The Equivalence Theorem
Our main result is
Theorem 2 (Equivalence Theorem) There is a unique truth-leaning equi-
librium outcome, a unique optimal mechanism outcome, and these two out-
comes coincide.
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The intuition is roughly as follows. Consider a truth-leaning equilibrium
where a type t pretends to be another type s. Then, first, type s reveals his
type s (had s something better, t would have it as well); and second, the
value of s must be higher than the value of t (no one will want to pretend
to be worth less than they really are).7 Thus t and s are not separated in
this equilibrium, and we claim that they cannot be separated in an optimal
mechanism either: the only way for the principal to separate them would
be to give a higher reward to t than to s (otherwise t would pretend to be
s), which is not optimal since the value of t is lower than the value of s
(decreasing the reward of t or increasing the reward of s would bring the
rewards closer to the values). The conclusion is that optimal mechanisms
can never separate more than truth-leaning equilibria do (the converse is
immediate since whatever can be done without commitment can clearly also
be done with commitment).
Remarks. (a) Outcomes. The Equivalence Theorem is stated in terms of
outcomes—which uniquely determine the (ex-post) payoffs of both the agent
and the principal for every type t. While there may be multiple truth-leaning
equilibria, this can happen only when both players are indifferent, and then
the payoffs are the same (see Appendix B.9).
(b) Tightness of the result. All the assumptions except differentiability
are indispensable to the Equivalence Theorem: dropping any single condition
yields examples where the result does not hold (see Appendix B). As for dif-
ferentiability, it is only a convenient technical assumption, as the equivalence
result holds also without it (see Appendix C.10).
(c) Constrained Pareto efficiency. In the basic quadratic-loss case, where,
as we have seen, v(q) equals the expectation of the values v(t) with re-
spect to q, condition (P) implies that the ex-ante expectation of the re-
wards, i.e., E [pit] =
∑
t∈T pt pit, equals the ex-ante expectation of the values
E [v(t)] =
∑
t∈T pt v(t) = v(T ) (because E [pit|s] = v(q(s)) = E [v(t)|s] for
every message s that is used; take expectation over s). Therefore all Nash
equilibria yield to the agent the same ex-ante expected payoff E [pit] = v(T )
7However reasonable these conditions may seem, they need not hold for equilibria that
are not truth-leaning.
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(they differ ex post, however, in the way this amount is split among the
types). Since, by the Equivalence Theorem, the truth-leaning equilibria max-
imize the principal’s ex-ante expected payoff, it follows that the truth-leaning
equilibria are constrained Pareto efficient (i.e., ex-ante Pareto efficient among
all equilibria).
4 Proof of the Equivalence Theorem
The proof proceeds as follows. We start with some useful and interesting
properties of truth-leaning (Section 4.1), and then prove that the outcome
of any truth-leaning equilibrium outcome is an optimal mechanism outcome,
which is moreover unique (Section 4.2). Together with the existence of truth-
leaning equilibria (Proposition 1(i) in Section 2.2.1) this yields the result.
4.1 Preliminaries
Proposition 3 Let (σ, ρ) be an equilibrium that satisfies (A0) and (P0), let
pi be its outcome, and let S := {t ∈ T : σ¯(t) > 0} be the set of messages used
in equilibrium. Then
t ∈ S ⇔ σ(t|t) = 1 ⇔ v(t) ≥ pit = ρ(t) ; and (4)
t /∈ S ⇔ σ(t|t) = 0 ⇔ pit > v(t) = ρ(t) . (5)
Thus, the reward ρ(t) assigned to message t never exceeds the peak v(t)
of type t. Moreover, each type t that reveals the whole truth gets an outcome
that is at most his value (i.e., pit ≤ v(t)), whereas each type t that does not
reveal the whole truth gets an outcome that exceeds his value (i.e., pit > v(t)).
This may sound strange at first. The explanation is that the lower-value types
are the ones that have the incentive to pretend to be a higher-value type,
and so each message t that is used is sent by t as well as by “pretenders” of
lower value. In equilibrium, this effect is taken into account by the principal
by rewarding messages at their true value or less.
Proof. If t ∈ S, i.e., σ(t|t′) > 0 for some t′, then t is a best reply for type
t′, and hence also for type t (because t ∈ L(t) ⊆ L(t′) by (L1), (L2), and
18
t ∈ L(t′)); (A0) then yields σ(t|t) = 1. This proves the first equivalence in
(4) and in (5).
If t /∈ S then pit > ρ(t) (since t is not a best reply for t) and ρ(t) = v(t)
by (P0), and hence pit > v(t) = ρ(t) .
If t ∈ S then pit = ρ(t) (since t is a best reply for t); put α := pit = ρ(t).
Let t′ 6= t be such that σ(t|t′) > 0; then pit′ = ρ(t) ≡ α (since t is optimal
for t′); moreover, t′ /∈ S (since σ(t|t′) > 0 implies σ(t′|t′) < 1), and so, as
we have just seen above, v(t′) < pit′ ≡ α. If we also had v(t) < α, then the
in-betweenness property (1) would yield v(q(t)) < α (because the support
of q(t), the posterior after message t, consists of t together with all t′ 6= t
with σ(t|t′) > 0). But this contradicts v(q(t)) = ρ(t) ≡ α by the principal’s
equilibrium condition (P). Therefore v(t) ≥ α ≡ pit = ρ(t).
Thus we have shown that t /∈ S and t ∈ S imply contradictory statements
(pit > v(t) and pit ≤ v(t), respectively), which yields the second equivalence
in (4) and in (5).
Corollary 4 Let (σ, ρ) be an equilibrium that satisfies (A0) and (P0). If
σ(s|t) > 0 for s 6= t then v(s) > v(t).
Proof. σ(s|t) > 0 implies s ∈ S and t /∈ S, and thus v(s) ≥ ρ(s) by (4),
pit > v(t) by (5), and ρ(s) = pit because s is a best reply for t.
Thus, no type will ever pretend to be a lower-valued type (this does not,
however, hold for equilibria that are not truth-leaning, e.g., the uninformative
equilibrium in Example 2 in the Introduction).
4.2 From Equilibrium to Mechanism
This section proves that any truth-leaning equilibrium outcome is an optimal
mechanism outcome and, moreover, that the latter is unique. We first deal
with a special case where there is no separation, and then show how a truth-
leaning equilibrium yields a decomposition into instances of this special case.
Proposition 5 Assume that there is a type s ∈ T such that s ∈ L(t) for
every t. If v(t) < v(T ) for every t 6= s then the outcome pi∗ with pi∗t = v(T )
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for every incentive-compatible pi, with equality if and only if pit = pi
∗
t = v(T )
for all t ∈ T.
Thus every type can pretend to be s, and so s has the least amount of
evidence (e.g., no evidence at all). The condition v(t) < v(T ) for every t 6= s
implies that v(T ) ≤ v(s) by in-betweenness (1), and so v(t) < v(s) for every
t 6= s; see Figure 2. To get some intuition, consider the simplest case of only
two types, say, T = {s, t}. Because the (IC) constraint pit ≥ pis goes in the
opposite direction of the peaks’ inequality v(t) < v(s), it follows that the
maximum of H(pi) = pshs(pis) + ptht(pit) subject to pit ≥ pis is attained only
when pit and pis are equal. Indeed, if pit > pis then we must have pit > v(t)
or pis < v(s), and so decreasing pit or increasing pis brings it closer to the
corresponding peak, and hence increases the value of H. Thus pit = pis = x
for some x, and then the maximum is attained when x equals the peak of
hp(x) = pshs(x) + ptht(x), i.e., when x = v(T ).
Proof. First, v(t) < v(T ) for all t 6= s implies by in-betweenness (1) that
v(R) ≥ v(T ) for every set R ⊆ T that contains s. Next, let pi maximize H(pi)
subject to the (IC) constraints; we will show that pi must equal pi∗ (which
satisfies all (IC) constraints, as equalities).
Put α := mint pit and R := {r ∈ T : pir = α}. Because one may change the
common value of pir for all r ∈ R to any α′ close enough to α so that all (IC)
v(t) v(t′) v(s)v(T )
t t′ s
L:
IC: pis ≤ pit, pis ≤ pit′
Figure 2: Proposition 5
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inequalities continue to hold (specifically, α′ ≤ β where β := mint/∈R pit > α),
the optimality of pi implies that α must maximize
∑
t∈R ptht(x) = p(R)hR(x),
and so α = v(R). But R contains s (because the (IC) constraints include pis ≤
pit for all t 6= s), and so α = v(R) ≥ v(T ). Therefore H(pi) =
∑
t ptht(pit) ≤∑




t ) = H(pi
∗) (the first inequality
because pis = α, and for t 6= s the function ht(x) decreases after its peak v(t)
and pit ≥ α ≥ v(T ) > v(t); the second inequality because hT (x) decreases
after its peak v(T ) and α ≥ v(T )). Moreover, all the above functions are
strictly decreasing after their peaks, and so to get equalities throughout we
must have pit = α = v(T ) for all t, i.e., pi = pi
∗.
Proposition 6 Let pi∗ be a truth-leaning equilibrium outcome; then pi∗ is the
unique optimal mechanism outcome.
Proof. Let (σ, ρ) be an equilibrium that satisfies (A0) and (P0) and has
outcome pi∗ (by Proposition 1). Because pi∗ satisfies (IC) by (L2), we need
to show that H(pi∗) > H(pi) for every pi 6= pi∗ that satisfies (IC).
Let S := {s ∈ T : σ¯(s) > 0} be the set of messages that are used in the
equilibrium (σ, ρ), and, for each s ∈ S, let Ts := {t ∈ T : σ(s|t) > 0} be the
set of types that play s. For every t 6= s in Ts we then have s ∈ L(t) and
t /∈ S (because σ(s|t) < 1 implies σ(t|t) < 1), and so v(t) = ρ(t) < pi∗t =
pi∗s = ρ(s) = v(q(s)) (by (5) and (4) in Proposition 3, and the principal’s
equilibrium condition (P)). We can therefore apply Proposition 5 to the set
of types Ts with the distribution q(s) as prior, to get (6) for every pi that
satisfies (IC), with equality only if pit = pi
∗
t for every t ∈ Ts.











Multiplying (6) by σ¯(s) > 0 and summing over s ∈ S therefore yields H(pi) ≤
H(pi∗) for every pi that satisfies (IC) (use (7) for both pi and pi∗). Moreover,
to get equality we need equality in (6) for each s ∈ S; that is, pit = pi∗t for
every t ∈ ∪s∈STs = T.
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A Appendix: Proof of Proposition 1
We prove here Proposition 1 in Section 4.1: first, the existence of truth-
leaning equilibria, and second, their payoff equivalence to equilibria that
satisfy (A0) and (P0). The former is a standard fixed-point proof, while the
latter turns out to be somewhat more delicate than the intuitive arguments
in Section 4.1 may suggest; in particular, it uses the differentiability of the
functions8 ht.
Proof of Proposition 1. (i) Existence. First, a standard fixed-point
argument shows that the game Γε possesses a Nash equilibrium. Let Σε be
the set of strategies of the agent in Γε; then Σε is a compact and convex
subset of ∆(T )T . Every σ in Σε uniquely determines the principal’s best
reply ρ ≡ ρσ by ρσ(s) = v(q(s)) for every s ∈ T (cf. (P); in Γε every message
is used: σ¯(s) ≥ εsps > 0). The mapping from σ to ρσ is continuous: the
posterior q(s) ∈ ∆(T ) is a continuous function of σ (because σ¯(s) is bounded
away from 0), and v(q) is a continuous function of q (by the Maximum
Theorem together with the single-peakedness condition (SP), which gives
the uniqueness of the maximizer). The set-valued function Φ that maps each
σ ∈ Σε to the set of all σ′ ∈ Σε that are best replies to ρσ in Γε is therefore
upper hemicontinuous, and a fixed point of Φ, whose existence is guaranteed
by the Kakutani fixed-point theorem, is precisely a Nash equilibrium of Γε.
Second, the strategy sets of the two players are compact (for the principal,
see in-betweenness in Section 2), and so limit points of Nash equilibria of Γε—
i.e., truth-leaning equilibria of Γ—exist (it is immediate to verify that any
limit point of Nash equilibria of Γε is a Nash equilibrium of Γ, i.e., satisfies
(A) and (P)).
(ii) (A0) and (P0). Let (σ, ρ) be a truth-leaning equilibrium, given by
sequences εnt →n 0+, εnt|t → 0+, and (σn, ρn) →n (σ, ρ) such that (σn, ρn) is a
Nash equilibrium in Γε
n
for every n (which is easily seen to imply that (σ, ρ)
is a Nash equilibrium of Γ, i.e., that (A) and (P) hold).
Let t be such that σ(t|t) < 1. Then σ(s|t) > 0 for some s 6= t in L(t), and
so σn(s|t) > 0 for all (large enough) n. In Γεn we thus have: s is a best reply
8See Appendix C.10 for the nondifferentiable case.
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for t, hence ρn(s) ≥ ρn(t) + εnt > ρn(t), hence t is not optimal for any r 6= t
(because t ∈ L(r) implies s ∈ L(r) by transitivity (L2) of L and s gives to r
a strictly higher payoff than t in Γε
n
), and thus σn(t|s) = 0. Taking the limit
yields:
if σ(t|t) < 1 then σ(t|s) = 0 for all s 6= t; (8)
this says that if t does not choose t for sure, then no other type chooses t.
Moreover, the posterior qn(t) after message t puts all the mass on t (since
σn(t|t) ≥ εnt|t > 0 whereas σn(t|s) = 0 for all s 6= t), i.e., qn(t) = 1t, and so
ρn(t) = v(qn(t)) = v(t); in the limit:
if σ(t|t) < 1 then ρ(t) = v(t). (9)
This in particular yields (P0), because σ¯(t) = 0 implies σ(t|t) = 0 < 1.
To get (A0) we may need to modify σ slightly, as follows. Let t ∈ T be
such that t is a best reply for t (i.e., ρ(t) = maxs∈L(t) ρ(s)) but σ(t|t) < 1.
Then ρ(t) = v(t) by (9), and every message s 6= t that t uses, i.e., σ(s|t) > 0,
gives the same reward as message t, and so v(q(s)) = ρ(s) = ρ(t) = v(t).
Therefore we define σ′ to be identical to σ except that type t chooses only
message t; i.e., σ′(t|t) = 1 and σ′(s|t) = 0 for every s 6= t.
Let q′(s) be the new posterior after a message s 6= t that was used by t
(i.e., σ(s|t) > 0; note that σ¯′(s) ≥ ps > 0 since σ′(s|s) = σ(s|s) = 1 by (8)
applied to s). Let α := v(q(s)) = v(t) (see above); using the differentiability
of the functions hr we will show that the peak of hq′(s) is also at
9 α. Indeed,
q(s) is a weighted average of q′(s) and 1t, and so hq(s) is a weighted average
of hq′(s) and ht. The derivatives of hq(s) and ht both vanish at α, and so the
derivative of hq′(s) must also vanish there—thus v(q
′(s)) = α = v(q(s) = v(t).
It follows that (σ′, ρ) is a Nash equilibrium of Γ: the agent is indifferent
between the messages t and s, and the principal maximizes his payoff also
at the new posterior q′(s). Clearly (8) and (9), and hence (P0), continue
to hold; moreover, the outcome remains the same. Proceeding this way for
every t as needed will in the end yield also (A0).
9Example 12 in Appendix C.10 shows that this property need not hold without differ-
entiability. The argument below amounts to strict in-betweenness; see Appendix C.2.
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B Appendix: Tightness of the Equivalence
Theorem
We will show here that our Equivalence Theorem is tight. First, we show
that dropping any single assumption (except for differentiability, which is
assumed for convenience; see Appendix C.10) allows examples where the
equivalence between optimal mechanisms and truth-leaning equilibria does
not hold (Sections B.1 to B.7). Second, we show that the conclusions cannot
be strengthened; specifically, truth-leaning equilibria need be neither pure
nor unique (Sections B.8 and B.9).
B.1 Agent’s Payoffs Depend on Type
We provide a slight variant of the examples in the Introduction (which can
also be easily restated in the standard Crawford and Sobel 1982 cheap-talk
setup) that shows that the equivalence result may fail when the agent’s types
do not all have the same preference: commitment strictly helps here.
Example 3 There are only two types of professor, and they are equally
likely: t0, with no evidence and value 60, and t−, with negative evidence and
value 30. As above, the dean wants to set the salary as close as possible to
the value, and t0 wants as high a salary as possible. However, t− now wants
his salary to be as close as possible to 50 (for instance, getting too high a
salary would entail duties that he does not like): his utility when he gets
salary x is −(x− 50).
There can be no separation between the two types in equilibrium: when no
evidence is provided the salary is between 45 and 60 (the posterior probability
of t−, which depends on his probability of providing no evidence, is at most
1/2, and so the resulting average of 30 and 60 is at least 45); but any salary
in that range is strictly preferred by t− to 30, which is what he gets when he
reveals his evidence. Thus the uninformative equilibrium where no evidence
is provided and the salary is set to 45, the average of the two values, is the
unique Nash equilibrium.
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Consider now the mechanism where the salary policy is to pay 30 when
negative evidence is provided, and 75 when no evidence is provided. Since
t− prefers 30 to 75, he will reveal his evidence, and so separation is obtained.
The mechanism outcome is better for the dean than the equilibrium outcome
(he makes an error of 15 for t0 only in the mechanism, and an error of 15
for both types in equilibrium). Note that the above mechanism requires
the dean to commit to pay 75 when he gets no evidence; otherwise, after
getting no evidence (which happens when the type is t0), he will want to
change his decision and pay 60 instead. In general, commitment is required
when implementing reward schemes that are not ex-post optimal (our result
implies that this does not happen in evidence games; the requirement that
is not satisfied in Example 3 is that the agent’s utility be the same for all
types). ¤
Remarks. (a) Two optimal mechanisms are as follows: the salaries are set
to 30 for negative evidence and 70 for no evidence in the first, and to 40 and
60, respectively, in the second; in both mechanisms, t−, who is indifferent
between revealing and concealing his evidence, reveals it.
(b) Taking the utility of t0 to be −(x − 80)2, which does not affect the
example, sets it in the standard Crawford and Sobel (1982) cheap-talk setup.
The fact that commitment may be advantageous in cheap-talk games is
known; see Krishna and Morgan (2007) and Goltsman et al. (2009).
B.2 Without Reflexivity (L1)
We provide an example where the condition (L1) that t ∈ L(t) for all t ∈ T
is not satisfied—some type cannot tell the whole truth and reveal his type—
and there is a truth-leaning Nash equilibrium whose payoffs are different from
those of the optimal mechanism.
Example 4 The type space is T = {0, 2, 4} with the uniform distribution:
pt = 1/3 for each t ∈ T. The principal’s payoff functions are ht(x) = −(x−t)2,
and so v(t) = t for all t. Types 0 and 2 have less evidence than type 4, but
message 4 is not allowed; i.e., L(0) = {0}, L(2) = {2}, and L(4) = {0, 2}.
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The unique optimal mechanism outcome is pi0 = v(0) = 0 and pi2 = pi4 =
v({2, 4}) = 3, i.e.,10 pi = (pi0, pi2, pi4) = (0, 3, 3).
Truth-leaning entails no restrictions here: types 0 and 2 each have a
single message (their type), and type 4 cannot send message 4. There are
two Nash equilibria: (i) 4 sends message 2, ρ(0) = 0, ρ(2) = 3, with outcome
pi = (0, 3, 3) (which is the optimal mechanism outcome); (ii) 4 sends message
0, ρ(0) = 2, ρ(2) = 2, with pi′ = (2, 2, 2). Note that H(pi) > H(pi′). ¤
B.3 Without Transitivity (L2)
We provide an example where (L2) is not satisfied—the “less evidence” rela-
tion is not transitive—and there is a truth-leaning equilibrium outcome that
is different from the optimal mechanism outcome.
Example 5 The type space is T = {0, 2, 4} with the uniform distribution:
pt = 1/3 for each t ∈ T. The principal’s payoff functions are ht(x) = −(x−t)2,
and so v(t) = t for all t. The allowed messages are L(0) = {0, 4}, L(2) =
{2}, and L(4) = {2, 4}. This does not satisfy (L2): type 0 can send message
4 and type 4 can send message 2, but type 0 cannot send message 2.
The unique optimal mechanism is given by11 the reward scheme ρ =
(0, 3, 0), with outcome pi = (0, 3, 3); indeed, if 2 and 4 are separated then
it is best to set ρ(2) = v(2) = 2 and ρ(4) = v({0, 4}) = 2, yielding the
outcome pi′ = (2, 2, 2); and if they are not separated then it is best to set
ρ(2) = v({2, 4}) = 3 and ρ(0) = ρ(4) = v(0) = 0, yielding the outcome
pi = (0, 3, 3); the latter is better: H(pi) = −2/3 > −8/3 = H(pi′).
There is no equilibrium satisfying (A0) and (P0) with outcome pi: type 0
must use 0 (by (A0), because ρ(0) = pi0), types 2 and 4 must use 2 (because
pi2 = pi4 = 3), but then 4 is unused and so ρ(4) = v(4) = 4 (by (P0)),
contradicting (P).
10When writing vectors such as pi the coordinates are ordered according to increasing
value; thus here we have pi = (pi0, pi2, pi4) (recall that v(t) = t).
11While type 0 can send message 4, he cannot fully mimic type 4, because he cannot
send message 2, which type 4 can. The incentive-compatibility constraints can no longer
be written as pit ≥ pis for s ∈ L(t) as in Section 2.3; they are pit = max{ρ(s) : s ∈ L(t)}
where ρ : T → R is a reward scheme (cf. Green and Laffont 1986).
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Both pi and pi′ are truth-leaning equilibrium outcomes:12 take Γε with
εt = εt|t = ε for all t; then pi obtains from the limit of
13 σε(·|0) = (ε, 0, 1− ε),
σε(·|4) = (0, 1− ε, ε), and ρε = (0, 3− ε/(2− ε), 4ε); and pi′ obtains from the
limit of σε(·|0) = (ε, 0, 1− ε), σε(·|4) = (0, 0, 1), and ρε = (0, 2, 4/(2− ε). ¤
B.4 Without (A0)
We provide an example of a sequential equilibrium that does not satisfy the
(A0) condition of truth-leaning, and whose outcome differs from the unique
optimal mechanism outcome.
Example 6 The type space is T = {0, 2, 4} with the uniform distribution:
pt = 1/3 for each t ∈ T. The principal’s payoff functions are ht(x) = −(x−t)2
(and so v(t) = t) for each t ∈ T. Type 0 has less evidence than type 4,
who has less evidence than type 2; i.e., L(0) = {0}, L(2) = {0, 2, 4}, and
L(4) = {0, 4}.
The unique optimal mechanism outcome is pi = (0, 3, 3), and in the unique
equilibrium that satisfies (A0) and (P0) types 2 and 4 send message 4 (type
0 must send 0) and14 ρ = (0, 0, 3). There is however another (sequential)
equilibrium: type 2 sends message 4 and type 4 sends message 0, and ρ′ =
(2, 2, 2), with outcome pi′ = (2, 2, 2), which is not optimal (H(pi′) < H(pi)). At
this equilibrium (P0) is satisfied (since ρ′(2) = v(2) for the unused message
2), but (A0) is not satisfied (since message 2 is optimal for type 2 but he
sends 4). ¤
B.5 Without (P0)
Example 2 in the Introduction has an equilibrium (the uninformative equi-
librium) that satisfies (A0) but does not satisfy (P0), and its outcome differs
12Once we go beyond our setup, the outcome equivalence given in Proposition 1 between
truth-leaning and (A0)+(P0) need no longer hold.
13σε(·|0) = (ε, 0, 1 − ε) means that σε(s|0) = ε, 0, 1 − ε for s = 0, 2, 4, respectively (the
order on types is again increasing in value); similarly for ρε.
14By Corollary 4 and Appendix C.7 (b) we may drop 0 from L(2).
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from the unique optimal mechanism outcome. However, that specific equilib-
rium can be ruled out by requiring the belief of the principal after an unused
message to be equal to the conditional probability over the set of types that
can send that message. That is, if message t is unused then put q(t) =
p|L−1(t), the conditional of the prior p over the set L−1(t) := {r ∈ T : t ∈
L(r)} of all types r that can send message t, and ρ(t) = v(q(t)) = v(p|L−1(t))
(instead of q(t) = 1t and ρ(t) = v(t) in (P0)). The following example shows
that replacing (P0) with this requirement is not enough to get equivalence.
Example 7 The type space is T = {0, 3, 10, 11} with the uniform distri-
bution: pt = 1/4 for each t. The principal’s payoff functions are ht(x) =
−(x− t)2 (and so v(t) = t) for each t ∈ T. Types 10 and 11 both have less ev-
idence than type 0, and more evidence than type 3; i.e., L(0) = {0, 3, 10, 11},
L(3) = {3}, L(10) = {3, 10}, and L(11) = {3, 11}.
The unique equilibrium that satisfies (A0) and (P0) is mixed: σ(·|0) =
(0, 0, 3/7, 4/7), all the other types t 6= 0 reveal their type, and ρ = (0, 3, 7, 7)
(use for instance L′ as in Appendix C.7 (b); note that v(q(10)) = v(q(11)) =
v({0, 10, 11}) = 7). The unique truth-leaning and optimal mechanism out-
come is thus pi = (7, 3, 7, 7).
Consider now the uninformative equilibrium where every type sends mes-
sage 3 and ρ = (0, 6, 5, 5.5) (note that ρ(3) = v(T ) = 6); its outcome
pi′ = (6, 6, 6, 6) is different from pi. This equilibrium satisfies (A0) (because
type 3 sends message 3) but not (P0) (for types 10 and 11). However, it
does satisfy the alternative condition above: ρ(0) = v(L−1(0)) = v(0) = 0,
ρ(10) = v(L−1(10)) = v({0, 10}) = 5, and ρ(11) = v(L−1(11) = v({0, 11}) =
5.5. ¤
B.6 Without Payoff or Probability Boost
We provide an example where in the perturbed games telling the truth gets
no payoff boost or no probability boost, and the resulting outcome differs
from the unique optimal mechanism outcome.
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Example 8 The type space is T = {0, 2, 4, 6} with the uniform distribution:
pt = 1/4 for each t ∈ T. The principal’s payoff functions are ht(x) = −(x−t)2
(and so v(t) = t) for each t ∈ T. The mapping L is L(0) = {0, 4}, L(2) =
{0, 2, 4, 6}, L(4) = {4}, and L(6) = {4, 6} (e.g., type 4 has no evidence, type
0 has a piece of negative evidence, type 6 has a piece of positive evidence,
and type 2 has both pieces of evidence; this is the same evidence structure
as in Example 2 in the Introduction15).
The unique optimal mechanism outcome is pi = (2, 4, 2, 4), and in the
unique equilibrium that satisfies (A0) and (P0) types 0 and 4 send message
4 and types 2 and 6 send message 6.
The uninformative equilibrium where every type uses message 4 and the
outcome is pi′ = (3, 3, 3, 3) (with H(pi′) = −5 < −4 = H(pi)) is the limit of
Nash equilibria (σε, ρε) of Γε with ε6 = 0 and all other εt and εt|t equal to
ε, as follows: σε(0|0) = σε(2|2) = σε(6|6) = ε, σε(6|2) = ε(6 − 5ε)/(2 + ε),
and with the remaining probabilities every type uses 4; and ρε = (0, 2, 3 −
4ε/(2− ε), 3− 4ε/(2− ε)).
If we instead take ε6|6 = 0 and all other εt|t and εt to be equal to ε, then the
Nash equilibria of Γε with σε(0|0) = σε(2|2) = ε, σε(4|0) = σε(4|2) = 1− ε,
σε(4|4) = σε(4|6) = 1, and ρε(0) = 0, ρε(2) = 2, ρε(4) = (6 − ε)/(2 + ε) ≥
ρε(6) (message 6 is unused) again yield pi′ in the limit. ¤
B.7 Without (SP)
We provide an example where one of the functions ht is not single-peaked
and all the Nash equilibria yield an outcome that is strictly worse for the
principal than the optimal mechanism outcome.
Example 9 The type space is T = {1, 2} with the uniform distribution,
i.e., pt = 1/2 for t = 1, 2. The principal’s payoff functions h1 and h2 are both
strictly increasing for x < 0, strictly decreasing for x > 2, and piecewise
linear16 in the interval [0, 2] with values at x = 0, 1, 2 as follows: −3, 0,−2
15The only reason that we do not work with Example 2 is that the numbers here are
smaller and easier to handle.
16The example is not affected if the two functions h1, h2 are made differentiable (by
smoothing out the kinks at x = 0, 1, and 2).
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for h1, and 2, 0, 3 for h2. Thus h1 has a single peak at v(1) = 1, whereas h2 is
not single-peaked: its global maximum is at v(2) = 2, but it has another local
maximum at x = 0. Type 2 has less evidence than type 1, i.e., L(1) = {1, 2}
and L(2) = {2}.
Consider first the optimal mechanism; the only (IC) constraint is pi1 ≥ pi2.
Fixing pi1 (in the interval [0, 2]), the value of pi2 should be as close as possible
to one of the two peaks of h2, and so either pi2 = 0 or pi2 = pi1. In the
first case the maximum of H(pi) is attained at pi = (1, 0), and in the second
case, at pi′ = (2, 2) (because 2 is the peak of hp = (1/2)h1 + (1/2)h2). Since
H(pi) = 1 > 1/2 = H(pi′), the optimal mechanism outcome is pi = (1, 0).
Next, we will show that every Nash equilibrium (σ, ρ), whether truth-
leaning or not, yields the worse outcome pi′ = (2, 2). Indeed, type 2 can only
send message 2, and so the posterior q(2) after message 2 must put at least
as much weight on type 2 as on type 1 (i.e., q2(2) ≥ 1/2 ≥ q1(2); recall that
the prior is p1 = p2 = 1/2). Therefore the principal’s best reply is always 2
(because hq(2)(0) < 0, hq(2)(1) = 0, and hq(2)(2) > 0). Therefore type 1 will
never send the message 1 with positive probability (because then q(1) = (1, 0)
and so ρ(1) = v(1) = 1 < 2). Thus both types only send message 2, and
we get an equilibrium if and only if ρ(2) = 2 ≥ ρ(1) (and, in the unique
truth-leaning equilibrium, (P0) implies ρ(1) = v(1) = 1), resulting in the
outcome pi′ = (2, 2), which is not optimal: the optimal mechanism outcome
is pi = (1, 0). ¤
Thus, the separation between the types—which is better for the principal—
can be obtained here only with commitment.
B.8 Mixed Truth-Leaning Equilibria
We show here that we cannot restrict attention to pure equilibria: the agent’s
strategy may well have to be mixed (Example 7 above is another such case).
Example 10 The type space is T = {0, 2, 3} with the uniform distribution:
pt = 1/3 for all t. The principal’s payoff function is ht(x) = −(x − t)2,
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and so v(t) = t. Types 2 and 3 both have less evidence than type 0; i.e.,
L(0) = {0, 2, 3}, L(2) = {2}, and L(3) = {3}.
Let (σ, ρ) be a truth-leaning equilibrium. Only the choice of type 0 needs
to be determined. Since ρ(0) = 0 whereas ρ(2) ≥ 1 = v({0, 2}) and ρ(3) ≥
v({0, 3}) = 3/2, type 0 never chooses 0. Moreover, type 0 must put positive
probability on message 2 (otherwise ρ(2) = 2 > 3/2 = v({0, 3}) = ρ(3)), and
also on message 3 (otherwise ρ(3) = 3 > 1 = v({0, 2}) = ρ(2)). Therefore
ρ(2) = ρ(3) (since both are best replies for 0), and then α := σ(2|0) must
solve 2/(1 + α) = 3/(2−α), and hence α = 1/5. This is therefore the unique
truth-leaning equilibrium; its outcome is pi = (5/3, 5/3, 5/3). ¤
B.9 Multiple Truth-Leaning Equilibria
We show here that there need not be a unique truth-leaning equilibrium.
Now all truth-leaning equilibria (σ, ρ) coincide in their principal’s strategy
ρ (which is uniquely determined by the outcome pi: Proposition 3 implies
that ρ(t) = min{v(t), pit} for all t), but they may differ in their agent’s
strategies σ. However, this can happen only when the agent is indifferent—in
which case the principal is also indifferent—which makes the nonuniqueness
insignificant. As for optimal mechanisms, while there is a unique direct
mechanism with outcome pi (namely, the reward policy is pi itself, i.e., ρ(t) =
pit for all t), there may well be other optimal mechanisms (the reward for
a message t may be lowered when there is a message s 6= t in L(t) with
pis = pit).
An example with multiple truth-leaning equilibria is as follows.
Example 11 Let T = {0, 1, 3, 4} with the uniform distribution: pt = 1/4
for all t ∈ T ; the principal’s payoff functions are ht(x) = −(x − t)2 (and so
v(t) = t) for all t, and L(0) = {0, 1, 3, 4}, L(1) = {1, 3, 4}, L(3) = {3, 4},
and L(4) = {4} (i.e., a higher t goes with less evidence). The unique optimal
mechanism outcome is pit = v(T ) = 2 for all t, and (σ, ρ) is a truth-leaning
Nash equilibrium whenever ρ(0) = 0, ρ(1) = 1, ρ(3) = ρ(4) = 2, σ(·|0) =
(0, 0, α, 1−α), σ(·|1) = (0, 0, 1− 2α, 2α), σ(3|3) = 1, and σ(4|4) = 1, for any
α ∈ [0, 1/3]. ¤
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C Online Appendix: Extensions and Com-
ments
This appendix contains material that could not be included in the stream-
lined main body of the paper: additional results, extensions, discussions, and
comments. Among the more significant results we point out Proposition 7
(the equivalence result when messages need not be types), Section C.9 (the
structure of the optimal outcome), and Section C.10 (equivalence without
differentiability).
The order throughout is according to the sections in the main body of
the paper, followed by the two additional Sections C.9 and C.10.
C.1 Introduction (Section 1)
(a) The importance of being able to commit. Think for instance of the advan-
tage that it confers in bargaining, in oligopolistic competition (Stackelberg
vs. Cournot), and also in cheap talk (cf. Example 3—see Remark (b) fol-
lowing it—in Appendix B.1).
(b) Interaction timeline. Interestingly, what distinguishes between “signal-
ing” and “screening” is precisely the two different timelines of interaction that
we consider: the agent moves first and the principal responds in signaling,
and the principal moves first and the agent responds in screening.
(c) Mark Twain. The quotes are from his Notebook (1894). When he writes
“truth” it means “the whole truth,” since any partial truth requires remem-
bering what was revealed and what wasn’t.
(d) Application: medical overtreatment. A third possible application con-
cerns medical overtreatment, which is one of the more serious problems in
many health systems in the developed world; see, e.g., Brownlee (2008). One
reason for overtreatment may be fear of malpractice suits; but the more pow-
erful reason is that doctors and hospitals are paid more when overtreating.
To overcome this problem one needs to give doctors incentives to provide
evidence; the present paper may perhaps help in this direction.
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(e) Example 1. Formally, the dean wants to minimize (x − v)2, where x
is the salary and v is the professor’s value; the dean’s optimal response to
any evidence is thus to choose x to be the expected value of the types that
provide this evidence. The dean wants the salary to be “right” since, on the
one hand, he wants to pay as little as possible, and, on the other hand, if
he pays too little the professor may move elsewhere. The same applies when
the dean is replaced by the “market.”
In every sequential equilibrium the salary of a professor providing pos-
itive evidence must be 90 (because the positive-evidence type is the only
one who can provide such evidence), and similarly the salary of a professor
providing negative evidence must be 30. This shows that the uninformative
equilibrium—where the professor, regardless of his type, provides no evi-
dence, and the dean ignores any evidence that might be provided and sets
the salary to the average value of 60—is not a sequential equilibrium here.
Finally, we note that truth-leaning equilibria are always sequential equilibria.
(f) Example 2. It may be checked that the uninformative equilibrium satisfies
all the standard refinements in the literature; cf. Appendix C.4.
This uninformative equilibrium may be eliminated here also by taking
the posterior belief at unused messages to be the conditional prior (because
the belief at message t+ would then be 80%− 20% on t+ and t±); however,
this would not suffice in general—see Example 7 in Appendix B.5.
C.2 The Model (Section 2)
(a) Single-peakedness. When going to more general models (e.g., Hart, Kre-
mer, and Perry 2016), single-peakedness of the principal’s utilities is taken
with respect to the order on rewards that is induced by the agent’s preference.
(b) Averages of single-peaked functions. To get (SP) it does not suffice that
the functions ht for t ∈ T are all single-peaked, since averages of single-peaked
functions need not be single-peaked (this is true, however, if the functions
ht are strictly concave). For example, let ϕ(x) be a function that is strictly
increasing for x < −2, strictly decreasing for x > 2, has a single peak at
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x = 2, and takes the values 0, 3, 4, 7, 8 at x = −2,−1, 0, 1, 2, respectively; in
between these points interpolate linearly. Take h1(x) = ϕ(x) and h2(x) =
ϕ(−x). Then h1 and h2 are single-peaked (with peaks at x = 2 and x = −2,
respectively), but (1/2)h1 + (1/2)h2, which takes the values 4, 5, 4, 5, 4 at
x = −2,−1, 0, 1, 2, respectively, has two peaks (at x = −1 and x = 1).
Smoothing out the kinks and making ϕ differentiable (by slightly changing
its values in small neighborhoods of x = −2,−1, 0, 1, 2) does not affect the
example.
(c) Non-concavity. The single-peakedness condition (SP) goes beyond con-
cavity. Take for example h1(x) = −(x3−1)2 and h2(x) = −x6; then h1 is not
concave (for instance, h1(1/2) = −49/64 < −1/2 = (1/2)h1(0)+(1/2)h1(1)),
but, for every 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, the function hα has a single peak, at 3
√
α (because
h′α(x) = −6x2(x3 − α) vanishes only at x = 0, which is an inflection point,
and at x = 3
√
α, which is a maximum).17
(d) Strict in-betweenness. The differentiability of the functions ht is not
needed to get in-betweenness (1). Differentiability yields a stronger property,
strict in-betweenness : both inequalities in (1) are strict when the v(qi) are not












0), and is negative at x = y1 := maxi v(qi) (because y1 > v(qj) and so
h′qj(y1) < 0); therefore v(q) ∈ (y0, y1). Example 12 in Appendix C.10 shows
that without differentiability these strict inequalities need not hold.
Strict in-betweenness is used (implicitly) only in the final argument in
the Proof of Proposition 1 (ii) in Appendix A: if q is the average of q′ and
q′′, and v(q′′) = v(q), then necessarily v(q′) = v(q).
C.3 Evidence and Truth Structure (Section 2.1)
(a) Detectable deviations. If t were to provide a subset of his pieces of evi-
dence that did not correspond to a possible type s, it would be immediately
17Alternatively, (SP) holds for the strictly concave hˆ1(y) = −(y− 1)2 and hˆ2(y) = −y2;
applying the strictly increasing transformation y = x3, which preserves (SP), yields the
given h1 and h2.
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clear that he was withholding some evidence (think for instance of the pro-
fessor who provides to the dean only the Report of Referee #2). The only
undetectable deviations of t are to reveal all the evidence of another possible
type s that has fewer pieces of evidence than t (i.e., to pretend to be s).
However, our equivalence result would not change if we were to allow
messages that do not correspond to types; see Proposition 7 in (d) below.
(b) Partial order on types. A general approach to the truth and evidence
structure starts from a weak partial order18 “֌ ” on the set of types T, with
“ t ֌ s ” being interpreted as type t having (weakly) more evidence than
type s; we will say that “s is a partial truth at t” (or “s is less informative
than t”). The set of possible messages of the agent when the type is t, which
we denote by L(t), consists of all types that have less evidence than t, i.e.,
L(t) := {s ∈ T : t֌ s}. Thus, L(t) is the set of all possible “partial truth”
revelations at t, i.e., all types s that t can pretend to be. The reflexivity and
transitivity of the partial order ֌ are immediately seen to be equivalent19
to conditions (L1) and (L2).
Some natural models for the relation ֌ are as follows.
(i) Pieces of evidence: As in Section 2.1, let E be the set of possible pieces
of evidence, and identify each type t with a subset Et of E; thus, T ⊆ 2E
(where 2E denotes the set of subsets of E). Put t ֌ s if and only if t ⊇ s;
that is, t has every piece of evidence that s has. It is immediate that֌ is a
weak partial order, i.e., reflexive and transitive.
(ii) Partitions: Let Ω be a set of states of nature, and let Λ1, Λ2, ..., Λn
be an increasing sequence of finite partitions of Ω (i.e., Λi+1 is a refinement
of Λi for every i = 1, 2, ..., n − 1). The type space T is the collection of all
blocks (also known as “kens”) of all partitions. Then t ֌ s if and only
18A weak partial order is a binary relation that is reflexive (i.e., t ֌ t for all t) and
transitive (i.e., t֌ s֌ r implies t֌ r for all r, s, t). However, it need not be complete
(i.e., there may be t, s for which neither t֌ s nor s֌ t holds). While for our results we
do not need to assume that֌ is asymmetric, in most applications it is; moreover, we can
always make it asymmetric by identifying any t 6= t′ with t֌ t′ and t′֌ t (and then for
any s and t, if s ∈ L(t) then t /∈ L(s)).
19Given L that satisfies (L1) and (L2), putting t֌ s iff s ∈ L(t) yields a weak partial
order.
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if t ⊆ s; thus more states ω are possible at s than at t, and so s is less
informative than t. For example, take Ω = {1, 2, 3, 4} with the partitions
Λ1 = (1234), Λ2 = (12)(34), and Λ3 = (1)(2)(3)(4). There are thus seven
types: {1, 2, 3, 4}, {1, 2}, {3, 4}, {1}, {2}, {3}, {4} (the first one from Λ1, the
next two from Λ2, and the last four from Λ3). Thus type t = {1, 2, 3, 4} (who
knows nothing) is less informative than type s = {1, 2} (who knows that the
state of nature is either 1 or 2), who in turn is less informative than type
r = {2} (who knows that the state of nature is 2); the only thing type t can
say is t, whereas type s can say either s or t, and type r can say either r, s, or
t. The probability p on T is naturally generated by a probability distribution
µ on Ω together with a probability distribution λ on the set of partitions: if
t is a ken in the partition Λi then pt = λ(Λi) · µ(t).
(iii) Signals: Let Z1, Z2, ..., Zn be random variables on a probability space
Ω, where each Zi takes finitely many values. A type t corresponds to some
knowledge about the values of the Zi-s (formally, t is an event in the field
generated by the Zi-s), with the straightforward “less informative” order:
s is less informative than t if and only if t ⊆ s. For example, the type
s = [Z1 = 7, 1 ≤ Z3 ≤ 4] is less informative than the type t = [Z1 = 7, Z3 =
2, Z5 ∈ {1, 3}]. (It is easy to see that (i) and (ii) are special cases of (iii).)
(c) General state space. We indicate how a general states-of-the-world setup
reduces to our model.
Let ω ∈ Ω be the state of the world, chosen according to a probability
distribution P on Ω (formally, we are given a probability space20 (Ω,F , P)).
Each state ω ∈ Ω determines the type t = τ(ω) ∈ T and the utilities UA(x; ω)
and UP (x; ω) of the agent and the principal, respectively, for any action
(reward) x ∈ R. The principal has no information, and the agent is informed
of the type t = τ(w). Since neither player has any information beyond the
type, we can reduce everything to the set of types T ; namely, pt = P [τ(ω) = t]
and U i(x; t) = E [U i(x; ω)|τ(ω) = t] for i = A,P.
For a simple example, assume that the state space is Ω = [0, 1] with the
uniform distribution, UA(x; ω) = x, and UP (x; ω) = −(x − ω)2 (i.e., the
20All sets and functions below are assumed measurable (and integrable when needed).
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“value” in state ω is ω itself). With probability 1/2 the agent is told nothing
about the state (which we call type t0), and with probability 1/2 he is told
whether ω is in [0, 1/2] or in (1/2, 1] (types t1 and t2, respectively). Thus
T = {t0, t1, t2}, with probabilities pt = 1/2, 1/4, 1/4 and expected values
v(t) = 1/2, 1/4, 3/4, respectively. This example illustrates the setup where
the agent’s information is generated by an increasing sequence of partitions
(cf. (ii) in the note above), which is useful in many applications (such as the
voluntary disclosure setup).
(d) Additional messages. The equivalence result continues to hold if we allow
additional messages beyond the set of types T ; for instance, a message such
as “t1 or t2” with t1 /∈ L(t2) and t2 /∈ L(t1), or a strict subset of the pieces
of evidence that one has and that does not correspond to a type.
Let M ⊇ T be the set of possible messages and let L(t) ⊆ M for each
t ∈ T satisfy (L1) and (L2); the latter is now “s ∈ L(t) and m ∈ L(s) imply
m ∈ L(t),” or, equivalently, “s ∈ L(t) implies L(t) ⊇ L(s).”
Proposition 7 Assume that the set M of possible messages contains the
set of types T and that the mapping L satisfies (L1) and (L2). Then the
Equivalence Theorem holds; moreover, replacing L(t) with L′(t) := L(t) ∩ T
for every t ∈ T does not change the truth-leaning and optimal mechanism
outcome.
Proof. Consider first optimal mechanisms. The Revelation Principle still
applies (because the (IC) constraints remain the same: pit ≥ pis for all types
s, t ∈ T with s ∈ L(t); or, see Theorem 2 in Green and Laffont 1986). But
direct mechanisms use only the set of types T as messages, and so M\T is
not relevant, and being an optimal mechanism outcome for L and for L′ is
the same.
Consider next truth-leaning equilibria (note that truth-leaning makes no
requirement on ρ(m) for messages m /∈ T that are not used). We claim
that none of the messages m /∈ T are used in a truth-leaning equilibrium
(σ, ρ), i.e., σ¯(m) = 0 for all m /∈ T. Indeed, let m /∈ T ; for every type t ∈ T
that uses m, i.e., σ(m|t) > 0, we get pit = ρ(m) > ρ(t) = v(t) (by (A),
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(A0), and (P0)). Therefore ρ(m) > v(q(m)) by in-betweenness (1), which
contradicts (P). Finally, every truth-leaning equilibrium for L′ is clearly also
a truth-leaning equilibrium for L.
(e) Normal evidence. Bull and Watson (2007) consider the notion of “normal
evidence,” which allows the set of messages M to be arbitrary, and requires
that for every type t in T there be a message mt in L(t) such that for
every type s, if mt ∈ L(s) then L(s) ⊇ L(t). Assuming that one can choose
mt 6= ms for21 all t 6= s, we identify each mt with t, which leads to the case
M ⊇ T discussed in (d) above (with normality yielding (L2)). Thus, again,
the Equivalence Theorem applies here too.
C.4 Truth-Leaning Equilibria (Section 2.2.1)
(a) Small perturbations. It is easy to check that truth-leaning would not be
affected if we were to require that all choices have positive probabilities in
Γε, namely, σ(s|t) ≥ εs|t > 0 for every s, t with s ∈ L(t), provided that εs|t
for s 6= t is much smaller than εt|t, i.e., εs|t/εt|t → 0.
(b) Refinements. Truth-leaning is consistent with all standard refinements in
the literature. Indeed, they all amount to certain conditions on the principal’s
belief (which determines the reward) after an out-of-equilibrium message.
Now the information structure of evidence games implies that in any equilib-
rium the payoff of a type s is minimal among all the types t that can send the
message s (i.e., pis ≤ pit for every t with s ∈ L(t)). Therefore, if message s
is not used in equilibrium (i.e., σ¯(s) = 0), then the out-of-equilibrium belief
at s that it was type s itself that deviated is allowed by all the standard
refinements, specifically, the intuitive criterion, the D1 condition, univer-
sal divinity, and the never-weak-best-reply criterion (Kohlberg and Mertens
1986, Banks and Sobel 1987, Cho and Kreps 1987). However, these refine-
ments may not eliminate equilibria such as the uninformative equilibrium
of Example 2 in Section 1.1 (see also Example 7 in Appendix B.5); only
21In Bull and Watson (2007) the messages are taken from M × T, and so if mt = ms
then they are replaced by (mt, t) and (ms, s), which are different for t 6= s.
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truth-leaning does.22 The no-incentive-to-separate (NITS) condition (Chen,
Kartik, and Sobel 2008), which requires the payoff of the lowest type to be
no less than its value (which is what the principal would pay if he knew the
type), is satisfied in our setup by all equilibria (because pis ≥ mint∈T v(t) for
every s; see the last sentence in Section 2).
(c) Voluntary disclosure. In most of the voluntary disclosure literature the
equilibrium is unique; when it is not, e.g., Shin (2003), the selected equilib-
rium (“sanitizing equilibrium”) turns out to yield the same outcome as the
truth-leaning equilibrium (we will show this in Proposition 8 below). As a
consequence of our Equivalence Theorem, the resulting outcome is thus also
the optimal mechanism outcome, and so the separation that is obtained in
the voluntary disclosure literature is the optimal separation.
The setup of Shin (2003) can be summarized as follows. The principal
minimizes the quadratic loss (and so we are in the basic setup); a type is
t = (s, f) where s and f are nonnegative integers with s+f ≤ N (for a fixed
N); the value v(s, f) of type (s, f) is decreasing in f, and the expected value
v¯(s) of the set Ts := {(s, f) : 0 ≤ f ≤ N − s} is increasing in s; finally, the
partial truth mapping is (s′, f ′) ∈ L(s, f) if and only if s′ ≤ s and f ′ ≤ f.
The “sanitizing” equilibrium which Shin (2003) has chosen to study is
given by: each type (s, f) sends the message (s, 0), and the rewards are
ρ(s, 0) = v¯(s) and ρ(s, f) = v(s,N − s) for f > 0 (thus the equilibrium
is supported by the not very reasonable belief that any out-of-equilibrium
message (s, f) with f > 0 is sent by the type with the lowest value (s,N−s)).
This is in general not a truth-leaning equilibrium (because, for instance,
v(s, 1) may well be higher than v¯(s), and then (P0) cannot hold). However,
there is always a truth-leaning equilibrium with the same outcome pi∗, namely,
pi∗s,f = v¯(s) for every (s, f), defined as follows. For every s let k ≡ ks be such
that v(s, k) ≥ v¯(s) > v(s, k + 1); then each type (s, f) with f ≤ k sends the
22Interestingly, if we consider the perturbed game where the agent’s payoff is increased
by εt > 0 when type t reveals the type, but the strategy is not required to satisfy σ(t|t) > 0,
the refinements D1, universal divinity, and the never-weak-best-reply criterion (but not
the intuitive criterion) yield in the limit the (P0) condition, and thus truth-leaning (we
thank Phil Reny for this observation).
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message (s, f) (i.e., reveals the type), whereas each type v(s, f) with f ≥ k+1
sends the message (s, j) for j = 0, 1, ..., k with probability λj = p(s,j)(v(s, j)−
v¯(s))/
∑k
i=0 p(s,i)(v(s, i) − v¯(s)). The rewards are ρ(s, f) = v¯(s) for f ≤ k
and ρ(s, f) = v(s, f) for f ≥ k + 1. Thus for every s the messages used in
equilibrium are (s, f) for all f ≤ k, and they all yield the same reward v¯(s). It
is straightforward to verify that this constitutes a truth-leaning equilibrium
(for (P), use
∑k
i=0 p(s,i)(v(s, i)− v¯(s)) =
∑N−s
i=k+1 p(s,i)(v¯(s)− v(s, i)), because
v¯(s) is the mean of the v(s, f)), and the outcome is pi∗. We have thus shown:
Proposition 8 In the voluntary disclosure model of Shin (2003), the “san-
itizing” equilibrium outcome is the unique truth-leaning outcome, and thus
also the unique optimal mechanism outcome.
Appendix C.9 provides an alternative proof.
C.5 Mechanisms and Optimal Mechanisms (Section 2.3)
(a) Green and Laffont. Green and Laffont (1986) show that, given (L1),
condition (L2) is necessary and sufficient for the Revelation Principle to
apply to any payoff functions of the agent. We need only the sufficiency
part, which can be easily seen directly. Let ρ be a reward function; when
the type is t the agent’s payoff is pit := maxr∈L(t) ρ(r), and the principal’s
payoff is23 ht(pit). If t can pretend to be s, i.e., s ∈ L(t), then L(t) ⊇ L(s) by
transitivity (L2), and thus pit ≥ pis, which yields the incentive-compatibility
constraints (IC). Conversely, any pi ∈ RT satisfying (IC) can be implemented
by (L1) with a direct mechanism, namely, ρ(t) = pit for every t.
(b) Truth-leaning mechanisms. Truth-leaning does not affect optimal mecha-
nisms, because a direct mechanism where the agent always reveals his type is
clearly truth-leaning (moreover, in the limit-of-perturbations approach, it is
not difficult to show that incentive-compatible mechanisms with and without
truth-leaning yield payoffs that are the same in the limit).
23Therefore in our setup the payoffs are not affected by how the agent breaks ties (an
issue that arises in general mechanism setups).
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(c) Existence and uniqueness of optimal mechanisms. It is immediate to see
that an optimal mechanism exists, because the function H is continuous and
the rewards pit can be restricted to a compact interval X (see Section 2).
Uniqueness of the optimal mechanism outcome is not, however, straightfor-
ward (unless the principal’s payoff functions ht, and thus H, are all strictly
concave—which we do not assume).
C.6 Proof (Section 4)
(a) Our proof concludes that the (unique) optimal mechanism outcome can
be obtained by a truth-leaning equilibrium indirectly (truth-leaning equilib-
ria exist, and their outcomes coincide with the unique optimal mechanism
outcome). A direct proof is presented in our companion paper Hart, Kre-
mer, and Perry (2016): a (truth-leaning) equilibrium is constructed from
an optimal mechanism using Hart and Kohlberg’s (1974) extension of Hall’s
marriage theorem (Halmos and Vaughn 1950).
C.7 Proof: Preliminaries (Section 4.1)
(a) Full revelation when value increases with evidence. Corollary 4 implies
that in the case where evidence always has positive value—i.e., if t has more
evidence than s then the value of t is at least as high as the value of s (that
is, s ∈ L(t) implies v(t) ≥ v(s))—the (unique) truth-leaning equilibrium is
fully revealing (i.e., σ(t|t) = 1 for every type t).
(b) Irrelevant messages. One may drop from L(t) every s 6= t with v(s) ≤
v(t); this affects neither the truth-leaning equilibrium outcomes (by Corollary
4) nor, by our Equivalence Theorem, the optimal mechanism outcomes; it
amounts to replacing each L(t) with its subset L′(t) := {s ∈ L(t) : v(s) >
v(t)} ∪ {t}. Note that L′ also satisfies (L1) and (L2).
We provide an alternative proof of this statement that deals directly with
mechanisms, and has the further advantage that instead of (SP), it uses
only the weaker assumption that every function ht is single-peaked (and not
necessarily differentiable).
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Let (IC’) denote the incentive constraints given by L′ (i.e., pit ≥ pis for
all s, t with s ∈ L′(t)).
Proposition 9 Assume that all the functions ht are single-peaked (and not
necessarily differentiable). Then pi∗ maximizes H(pi) subject to the (IC’)
constraints if and only if pi∗ maximizes H(pi) subject to the (IC) constraints.
Proof. Since (IC’) is a subset of the (IC) constraints, it suffices to show that
if pi∗ maximizes H(pi) subject to (IC’) then pi∗ satisfies all (IC) constraints.
Assume by way of contradiction that there are s, t such that s ∈ L(t)
but pi∗t < pi
∗
s; because pi
∗ satisfies (IC’), we must have v(s) ≤ v(t). Among
all pairs s, t as above, choose one where the difference v(t) − v(s) (which is
nonnegative) is minimal. Fix s and t. We have:
(i) All the (IC’) constraints of the form piu ≥ pit for some u are not binding
at pi∗; i.e., pi∗u > pi
∗
t for every u with t ∈ L′(u).
Proof. If piu ≥ pit is an (IC’) constraint then t ∈ L(u) and v(t) > v(u),
and so s ∈ L(u) by transitivity. If pi∗u = pi∗t then pi∗s > pi∗t = pi∗u and so
piu ≥ pis cannot be an (IC’) constraint; thus s /∈ L′(u), and so v(s) ≤ v(u).
Hence 0 ≤ v(u) − v(s) < v(t) − v(s), which contradicts the minimality of
v(t)− v(s).
(ii) pi∗t ≥ v(t).
Proof. If pi∗t < v(t) then pi
∗
t lies in the region where ht strictly increases,
and so slightly increasing pi∗t (which can be done by (i)) increases the objective
function H; this contradicts the optimality of pi∗.
(iii) All the (IC’) constraints of the form pis ≥ pir for some r are not
binding at pi∗; i.e., pi∗s > pi
∗
r for every r ∈ L′(s).
Proof. If pis ≥ pir is an (IC’) constraint then r ∈ L(s) and v(r) > v(s),
and so r ∈ L(t) by transitivity. If pi∗s = pi∗r then pi∗t < pi∗s = pi∗r and so pit ≥ pir
cannot be an (IC’) constraint; thus r /∈ L′(t), and so v(r) ≤ v(t). Hence
0 ≤ v(t)−v(r) < v(t)−v(s), which contradicts the minimality of v(t)−v(s).
(iv) pi∗s ≤ v(s).
Proof. If pi∗s > v(s) then pi
∗
s lies in the region where hs strictly decreases,
and so slightly decreasing pi∗s (which can be done by (iii)) increases the ob-
jective function H; this contradicts the optimality of pi∗.
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From (ii) and (iv) we get v(t) ≤ pi∗t < pi∗s ≤ v(s), contradicting v(s) ≤
v(t)).
C.8 From Equilibrium to Mechanism (Section 4.2)
(a) Generalizing Propositions 5 and 6. The strict inequalities v(t) < v(T ) for
every t 6= s are used in the Proof of Proposition 5 to get, by in-betweenness
(1), v(R) ≥ v(T ) for any R that contains s; for their other use, to imply
that ht(x) for t 6= s is strictly decreasing for x ≥ v(T ), the weak inequalities
v(t) ≤ v(T ) suffice. We thus get the following variant of Proposition 5:
Proposition 10 Assume that there is a type s ∈ T such that s ∈ L(t) for
every t. If24
(i) v(t) ≤ v(T ) for every t 6= s; and
(ii) v(R) ≥ v(T ) for every R that contains s (i.e., s ∈ R),
then the outcome pi∗ with pi∗t = v(T ) for all t ∈ T is the unique optimal
mechanism outcome.25
This yields the following generalization of Proposition 6:
Proposition 11 Let (σ, ρ) be a Nash equilibrium that satisfies, for every
message s that is used (i.e., σ¯(s) > 0),
(i) v(t) ≤ v(q(s)) for every t 6= s that plays s (i.e., σ(s|t) > 0); and
(ii) v(q(s)|R) ≥ v(q(s)) for every R that contains s (i.e., s ∈ R).
Then the outcome pi∗ of (σ, ρ) is the unique optimal mechanism outcome.
Proof. As in the Proof of Proposition 6, use the decomposition induced by
(7) and then, for each s with σ¯(s) > 0, apply Proposition 10 to Ts := {t :
σ(s|t) > 0} with prior q(s).
24Condition (i) is equivalent to “v(Q) ≤ v(T ) for every Q not containing s” (because
v(Q) ≤ maxt∈Q v(t) by in-betweenness (1)). Also, (i) and (ii) may be elegantly rewritten
as maxQ:s/∈Q v(Q) ≤ minR:s∈R v(R) (because by in-betweenness we have v(T\R) ≤ v(T ) ≤
v(R) for every R that contains s, and so v(T ) = minR:s∈R v(R)).
25When L(s) = {s} and L(t) = {t, s} for every t 6= s, conditions (i) and (ii) are also
necessary for pi∗ to be an optimal mechanism outcome—i.e., for “no separation” to be
optimal. Indeed, if v(t) > v(T ) for some t 6= s then put pit = v(t) > v(T ) = pi∗t , and if
v(R) < v(T ) for some R containing s then put pir = v(R) < v(T ) = pi
∗
r for all r ∈ R; in
each case the new pi satisfies all the constraints and H(pi) > H(pi∗).
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These results are useful in the nondifferentiable case (see Appendix C.10).
C.9 The Optimal Outcome
We provide here results on the structure of optimal mechanisms and their
outcomes, which is useful when dealing with specific applications.
A partition of T consists of disjoint sets T1, T2, ..., Tm whose union is T.
We will say that the ordered partition (T1, T2, ..., Tm) is consistent with L
(more precisely, consistent with the “having more evidence” order on types
induced by L; see Appendix C.3) if s ∈ L(t) for t ∈ Ti and s ∈ Tj implies
i ≥ j. Thus, types in T1 have the least evidence, and those in Tm, the most;
and, for any t ∈ Ti, we have L(t) ⊆ ∪j≤iTj: type t can only pretend to be a
type s in the same set or lower.
Proposition 12 Let pi be an optimal mechanism outcome. Then there exists
an ordered partition (T1, T2, ..., Tm) of T that is consistent with (the order
induced by) L such that v(T1) < v(T2) < ... < v(Tm) and pit = v(Ti) for every
t ∈ Ti.
Proof. Let α1 < α2 < ... < αm be the distinct values of the coordinates of
pi, and put Ti := {t ∈ T : pit = αi}. This yields a partition that is consistent
with L because s ∈ L(t) implies pit ≥ pis, and so t ∈ Ti and s ∈ Tj imply
i ≥ j. Changing the common value of pit for all t ∈ Ti to any other α′i
close enough to αi so that all (IC) inequalities are preserved (specifically,
αi−1 ≤ α′i ≤ αi+1) implies by the optimality of pi that αi must maximize∑
t∈Ti
ptht(x) = p(Ti)hTi(x), and so αi = v(Ti).
Remark. To find the optimal mechanism outcome, one thus needs to check
only finitely many outcomes (each one determined by some partition of T ).
A converse to Proposition 12 is as follows.
Proposition 13 Let (T1, T2, ..., Tm) be an ordered partition of T that is con-
sistent with (the order induced by) L such that v(T1) ≤ v(T2) ≤ ... ≤ v(Tm)
and for every i = 1, 2, ...,m, the unique optimal mechanism of the problem
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restricted to Ti is constant (i.e., pit = pit′ for all t, t
′ ∈ Ti). Then the unique
optimal mechanism outcome is pi∗ with pi∗t = v(Ti) for every t ∈ Ti and
i = 1, 2, ...,m.
Proof. Let (IC’) be the set of (IC) constraints pit ≥ pis with s, t in the same
Ti. The outcome pi
∗ satisfies all (IC’) constraints as equalities; moreover, it
satisfies the (IC) constraints (because s ∈ L(t) with t ∈ Ti and s ∈ Tj implies
i ≥ j and so pi∗t = v(Ti) ≥ v(Tj) = pi∗s). Therefore, once we show that pi∗
is the unique maximizer of H(pi) subject to (IC’), then it is also the unique
maximizer subject to (IC).
Now (IC’) allows us to consider each Ti separately, and so if pi is optimal
then pit = αi for all t ∈ Ti, and so we must have αi = v(Ti) (otherwise
αi could be slightly modified so that H will increase), which implies that
pi = pi∗.
To use Proposition 13 one combines instances where the optimal mech-
anism outcome is unique. One such instance, where there is a type with
minimal amount of evidence, is given by Proposition 5 in Section 4.2 (see
also its generalization, Proposition 10 in Appendix C.8). Another instance,
where the value decreases as one has more evidence, is given below.
Proposition 14 If L(t) = {s : v(s) ≥ v(t)} for all t then the outcome pi∗
with pi∗t = v(T ) for all t is the unique truth-leaning equilibrium outcome and
optimal mechanism outcome.
Proof. Without loss of generality assume that T = {1, 2, ..., n} and v is
monotonic: if t ≤ s then v(t) ≤ v(s). Because L(t) ⊇ {t, t + 1, ..., n} by
the assumption on L, (IC) implies that pi1 ≥ pi2 ≥ ... ≥ pin. Let pi be an
optimal mechanism outcome. If pi is constant (i.e., pi1 = ... = pin), then
optimality implies that pi = pi∗. If pi is not constant, let 1 ≤ r < n be such
that α := pi1 = ... = pir > pir+1 ≥ .. ≥ pin. Because we can slightly modify the
common value α of pi1, ..., pir without affecting (IC), optimality implies that
α = v({1, ..., r}), and so α ≤ v(r) by in-betweenness. Therefore for every
t ≥ r + 1 we have pit < α ≤ v(r) ≤ v(t), and so ht(pit) < ht(α) (the function
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where pi(α) := (α, ..., α), contradicting the optimality of pi.
As an application, combining Propositions 14 and 13 provides an alterna-
tive proof that the outcome of the sanitizing equilibrium of Shin (2003) is the
optimal mechanism outcome (cf. Appendix C.4 (c)); the ordered partition is
(T0, T1, ..., TN ) with Ts = {(s, f) : 0 ≤ f ≤ N − s}).
C.10 Equivalence without Differentiability
Assuming that the functions ht are differentiable has enabled us to work
with the simpler conditions (A0) and (P0) rather than with the limit-of-
perturbations approach. However, this was just for convenience: we will
show here that the equivalence result holds also in the nondifferentiable case.
We start with a simple example where one of the functions ht is not
differentiable and there is no equilibrium satisfying (A0) and (P0).
Example 12 The type space is T = {1, 2} with the uniform distribution,
pt = 1/2 for t = 1, 2. The principal’s payoff functions are h1(x) = −(x− 2)2
for x ≤ 1 and h1(x) = −x2 for x ≥ 1 (and so h1 is nondifferentiable at its
single peak v(1) = 1), and h2(x) = −(x− 2)2 (and so h2 has a single peak at
v(2) = 2). Both functions are strictly concave, and so hq has a single peak:
v(q) = 1 when q1 ≥ q2 and v(q) = 2q2 when q1 ≤ q2 (and thus26 v(T ) = 1).
Type 1 has more evidence than type 2, i.e., L(1) = {1, 2} and L(2) = {2}.
Let (σ, ρ) be a Nash equilibrium that satisfies (A0) and (P0). If type 1
sends message 1 then ρ(1) = v(1) = 1 and ρ(2) = v(2) = 2 (both by (P)),
contradicting (A): message 1 is not a best reply for type 1. If type 1 sends
message 2 then ρ(1) = v(1) = 1 (by (P0)) and ρ(2) = v(T ) = 1 (by (P)),
26The strict in-betweenness of Appendix C.2 does not hold here: the peak of h1 is
strictly less than the peak of h2, and the peak of their average equals the peak of h1.
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contradicting (A0): message 1 is a best reply for type 1 but he does not use
it. Thus there is no truth-leaning equilibrium. ¤
It may be easily checked that in this example (σ, ρ) is a Nash equilibrium
if and only if σ(2|1) = 1 and ρ(2) = 1 ≥ ρ(1), and so the outcome is
pi = (1, 1), the same as the optimal mechanism outcome; truth-leaning yields
that ρ(1) = v(1) = 1 (by (P0)).
In all our proofs, the differentiability of the functions ht was used in only
one place: to get (A0) in the last step of the Proof of Proposition 1 (ii)
in Appendix A. All other proofs throughout the paper use only the non-
differentiable version of single-peakedness, namely,
(SP0) Continuous Single-Peakedness. For every q ∈ ∆(T ) the principal’s
utility hq(x) is a continuous single-peaked function of the reward x.
Thus all the functions ht are continuous (rather than differentiable), and for
every q ∈ ∆(T ) there is v(q) such that the function hq(x) is strictly increasing
for x ≤ v(q) and strictly decreasing for x ≥ v(q).
Equivalence holds also under (SP0):
Proposition 15 Assume that the principal’s payoff function (ht)t∈T satis-
fies the continuous single-peakedness condition (SP0). Then there is a unique
truth-leaning equilibrium outcome, a unique optimal mechanism outcome,
and these two outcomes coincide.
Proof. We will use Proposition 11 in Appendix C.8 (which generalizes
Proposition 6 in Section 4.2). We thus need to show that every truth-leaning
limit equilibrium (σ, ρ) satisfies conditions (i) and (ii) of this proposition. We
proceed as in the Proof of Proposition 1 (ii). Let εnt →n 0+, εnt|t → 0+, and
(σn, ρn) →n (σ, ρ) be such that (σn, ρn) is a Nash equilibrium in Γεn for every
n. If σ(s|t) > 0 for t 6= s, then, as in the arguments leading to (8) and (9),
v(qn(s)) = ρn(s) ≥ ρn(t)+εnt > ρn(t) = v(t) for all large enough n. For every
R ⊆ T that contains s the posterior qn(s) is a weighted average of qn(s)|R,
the conditional of qn(s) on R, and 1t for all t /∈ R with σn(s|t) > 0, for
all of which v(qn(s)) > v(t), as we have just seen; therefore in-betweenness
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(1) implies that v(qn(s)) ≤ v(qn(s)|R). Thus v(t) < v(qn(s)) ≤ v(qn(s)|R)
for all large enough n; the continuity of v together with qn(s) → q(s) and
qn(s)|R → q(s)|R (because, by (8) and s ∈ R, the limit denominators are
bounded away from zero by psσ(s|s) = ps > 0) yield conditions (i) and (ii)
in the limit, as claimed.
Remark. As shown in the Proof of Proposition 1 (ii), every truth-leaning
equilibrium (σ, ρ) satisfies (P0) and, assuming differentiability, can be mod-
ified without changing the outcome so as to satisfy also (A0). Without dif-
ferentiability the latter is no longer true (as Example 12 shows); however, we
can obtain, again without changing the outcome, a weaker version of (A0):
if ρ(t) = max
r∈L(t)
ρ(r) and σ¯(t) > 0 then σ(t|t) = 1; (10)
here the condition that t chooses t for sure when it is a best reply for t is
required only when message t is used at all). To get (10): if σ(t|t) = 0
then σ¯(t) = 0 by (8) and no change is needed; and if 0 < σ(t|t) < 1 then
put σ′(t|t) := 0 and σ′(s|t) := σ(s|t) + σ(t|t) for some s 6= t that is played
by t, i.e., σ(s|t) > 0 (because both t and s are played by t it follows that
v(t) = ρ(t) = pit = ρ(s) = v(q(s)), and so v(q
′(s)) = pit by in-betweenness
(1), as q′(s) is a weighted average of q(s) and 1t).
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